Management of animal and plant pests on land and in freshwater and the coastal and marine environment is also covered in Themes One, Two and Three.

Biosecurity management is effectively coordinated between central and local government, private agencies and interested groups. Systems for managing pests affecting primary production and indigenous biodiversity are coordinated. New Zealand's biosecurity system complements international arrangements to minimise the risks of entry of unwanted organisms to New Zealand.

Management and surveillance systems are backed by effective research and the assessment of biosecurity risks. Ecologically and socially acceptable mechanisms are in place to balance the benefits of new introduced species against potential risks to indigenous species and ecosystems and other valued introduced species.

The framework for biosecurity management is provided by the Biosecurity Act 1993 and HSNO Act 1996. The Biosecurity Act provides for the exclusion of pests and unwanted organisms from New Zealand within a broad cost-benefit framework, as well as the eradication or management of pests once they are here. A number of government departments, as well as local government and nongovernmental agencies, have responsibilities under the Biosecurity Act.

The purpose of the HSNO Act is to protect the environment and the health and safety of people and communities by preventing or managing the adverse effects of hazardous substances and new organisms which are proposed to be introduced to the country. Recent developments in this management framework include:

• the establishment of the Environmental Risk Management Authority of New Zealand (ERMANZ);
• the creation of a Cabinet portfolio for biosecurity;
• the establishment of the Biosecurity Council; o the merger of the Ministries of Agriculture and Forestry;
• the launch of a new MAF Biosecurity Authority; and
• the commissioning of an independent review of New Zealand's border control services.

These developments aim to provide for greater coordination between agencies in biosecurity matters. The ERMANZ's primary role under the HSNO Act is to decide on applications for the manufacture, import or release of hazardous substances and new organisms into New Zealand. The Biosecurity Council's role is to advise the Minister of Biosecurity on policies and procedures to ensure interagency cooperation, and to provide information and education strategies. The Council has prepared a draft biosecurity strategy, and is developing a biosecurity research strategy. New Zealand is also currently involved in the development of an international Biosafety Protocol.

DoC has undertaken scoping assessments of risks posed by potential pests to indigenous species and ecosystems. However, the full integration of indigenous biodiversity considerations into the biosecurity management regime has yet to occur. One of the difficulties here is our limited knowledge about the effects of introduced species on indigenous biodiversity.

Summary of issues Coordination of biosecurity management
Recent initiatives under the Biosecurity and HSNO Acts (such as the establishment of the Biosecurity Council) are in the early stages of implementation. There is still a lack of clarity about some roles and responsibilities of different agencies in biosecurity management.

• Agencies do not yet have fully coordinated objectives, policies and operating procedures.
• There appears to be little incentive for agencies to take the initiative, under the Biosecurity Act, to control pests (particularly new pests) that present risks to indigenous biodiversity.
• Agency responsibilities for managing unwanted organisms detected as being present within New Zealand but not yet widespread are not being acted on because of insufficient priority and inadequate resources, for example the design and implementation of eradication programmes or preparation of pest management strategies.

• A lack of resources for identifying exotic organisms that pose a potential threat to indigenous biodiversity, and for detecting and responding to unwanted organisms that do arrive, may be increasing New Zealand's biosecurity risks.
• Surveillance programmes for specific pest species are costly, and therefore the geographical and ecological scope of surveillance programmes is restricted.
• There have been inconsistencies, both within and between agencies, in the way border control decisions are made and advice is given to the Government (for example, in assessing the risks posed by unwanted organisms, and the costs and benefits of taking action to prevent their introduction or establishment)⁵⁰.
• Under the Convention on Biological Diversity, New Zealand has agreed to promote notification, exchange of information, and consultation on activities that are likely to adversely affect biodiversity in other countries. Such activities may include the export of species that are known pests in New Zealand. However, there are few mechanisms in place to do this, beyond meeting the animal and plant health status requirements of other countries.

• Agencies are still in the early stages of developing biosafety protocols for GMOs.
• The roles of agencies in controlling GMOs have not been fully defined; two crucial areas are the post-release monitoring of new organisms (including GMOs) and managing responses to nonintended impacts of these organisms.
• In New Zealand there is a low awareness of biotechnology issues generally and, in particular, issues of biosafety and border control.
• The overall risks and benefits of GMOs to biodiversity need to be assessed.

• No agency has clear responsibility for surveillance for, and emergency response to, aquatic weeds and animal pests.
• Some of the greatest risks from potential aquatic weeds appear to be from a number of species already present in New Zealand but not yet widespread or naturalised (for example, the oxygen weed Hydrilla); their management currently falls outside of border control and biosecurity mechanisms.
• Uncertain identity (taxonomic uncertainty) of some introduced aquatic plant species can prevent a timely response being developed.

• Most agencies do not have adequate information to incorporate risks to indigenous biodiversity into their risk analysis and decision making protocols for biosecurity, nor is there yet an agreed consistent methodology for such risk assessment.
• Risk assessment methodologies for importing new organisms and for the control of unwanted organisms at the border are not fully aligned with each other.
• Under World Trade Organisation rules, justification for import restrictions should be based on sound science, and therefore our ability to impose restrictions on risk goods may be constrained by poor knowledge of the potential impacts of those organisms.
• There is a lack of knowledge for assessing the potential risks to indigenous biodiversity of exotic species that are already in New Zealand, but at present not widely distributed or naturalised.
• New Zealand's situation with respect to the relationship between introduced and indigenous species is unique, so shortfalls in knowledge in this area cannot be readily bridged by access to overseas information.
• There is insufficient expertise and technical capacity in aspects of biosecurity management (especially in relation to effects of pests and unwanted organisms on indigenous biodiversity) amongst relevant agencies.
• The potential risks and benefits of GMOs are not well understood and assessment systems are not easily implemented.

Action plan⁵²

Objective 5.1 Coordinating biosecurity management

Effectively coordinate biosecurity management within and across central and local government and non-governmental agencies, and clarify responsibilities for managing risks from unwanted organisms to indigenous biodiversity and important introduced species.

Key players: BC*, MfE, DoC, MAF, Mfish, ERMANZ, LGNZ53

b) Develop procedures to enhance cooperation between agencies and encourage information sharing on biosecurity issues.

Key players: BC*, MfE, DoC, MAF, Mfish, MoH, ERMANZ, LGNZ

c) Develop and implement a strategy to maintain and develop coordinated expertise and technical capacity within relevant agencies to enable efficient and effective emergency response actions to unwanted organisms.

Key players: BC*, MfE, DoC, MAF, Mfish, MoH, LGNZ

d) Periodically review whether biosecurity management is being effectively coordinated with respect to indigenous biodiversity.

Key players: BC*, DoC, LGNZ

Establish effective methods of assessing and managing risks from unwanted organisms to indigenous biodiversity in conjunction with those methods for introduced species.

a) Assess the probability and likely scale of adverse effects on indigenous biodiversity from potential pest species, including species that are:

1. not in New Zealand, but may be accidentally introduced through international trade and travel; and
2. already in New Zealand, but which have not become widespread .

Key players: BC*, MoRST, MfE, DoC, MAF, Mfish, research providers, RCs

b) Develop appropriate risk analysis and management procedures between government agencies to ensure consistent approaches to assessing the ecological, social and economic risks posed by pests, weeds and diseases, including the definition of agreed levels of biosecurity risk.

Key players: MAF*, BC*, MfE, DoC, Mfish, MoH, LGNZ, ERMANZ

c) Develop and implement indicators under the Environmental Performance Indicators Programme and strategies for assessing the effectiveness of biosecurity management in protecting indigenous biodiversity and important introduced species.

Key players: MfE*, RCs*, DoC, MAF

d) Finalise and implement the Biosecurity Research Strategy.

Key players: BC*, MoRST, MAF, DoC, MfE, MoH, research agencies

Maintain and enhance integrated border control measures as the first and most important line of defence for minimising biosecurity risks to New Zealand's indigenous biodiversity and important introduced species.

Key players: MAF*, DoC, MoH, Mfish, airport companies, port companies

b) Ensure that the development of import health standards incorporates a risk analysis of threats to indigenous biodiversity.

Key players: BC*, MAF*, DoC, Mfish, MoH

c) Continue to improve an integrated border control system to minimise the risks to biosecurity from the accidental or illegal importation of unwanted introduced species.

Key players: MAF*, DoC, Mfish, MoH

d) Minimise the loss of indigenous biodiversity through illegal trade.

Key players: DoC*, MAF, New Zealand Customs Service

e) Develop mechanisms to make available to importing countries any relevant information New Zealand has on the potential invasiveness of species being exported.

Key players: Not yet assigned*, MAF, DoC, Mfish, MoH, MFAT

Manage the introduction of new organisms (including genetically modified organisms) in a way that avoids adverse effects on New Zealand's indigenous biodiversity and important introduced species.

Key players: ERMANZ*, MfE, DoC, MAF, Mfish, MoH

b) Clarify responsibilities of different parties involved in biosafety management, in particular responsibilities for:

1. post-release monitoring; and
2.  management responses where unintended adverse effects from new organisms occur.

Key players: MfE*, ERMANZ*, MAF, BC

c) Establish a Royal Commission to review key issues surrounding the import, development and release of genetically modified organisms in New Zealand.

Key players: MfE*, DIA, MAF, MoRST, ERMANZ

Eradicate or contain introduced species that have the potential to become serious threats to New Zealand's indigenous biodiversity and important introduced species.

Key players: BC*, ERMANZ*, MfE, DoC, MAF, Mfish, industry associations

b) Raise public awareness about introduced species that pose a potential threat to indigenous biodiversity.

Key players: BC*, Mfish, DoC, MAF, RCs, industry associations

*Government lead

⁴⁷ The term "unwanted organisms" has specific meaning under the Biosecurity Act and could include specific genetically modified organisms. ⁴⁸ "New organisms" include any plant, animal or microorganism coming into New Zealand for the first time or a new species developed through genetic engineering (genetically modified organisms).

⁴⁹ See Principle 12 in Part Two.

⁵⁰ The merger of the former Ministries of Agriculture and Forestry has enabled border control responsibilities to be better integrated.

⁵¹ See Principle 12 in Part Two.

⁵² Actions shown in bold are priority actions (see Part Four).

⁵³ See key to key players.